O Say Can You See

1

If the Jury believe from the Evidence that Miss Brown, or those who claim under her, held possession of the Petitioner for 20 years after the time of her removal into Alexandria County, the law raises a presumption that the oath required by the 4th section of the Virginia act of 1792 was regularly taken, & it will be necessary for the Petitioner, in establishing any such point, to show, by Evidence in the case, that the oath was not taken in accordance with the requisitions of the said law.

Refused Ap. 12th 1845.

 

2

If the Jury believe from the Evidence that Miss Brown, being a resident of Alexandria County brought the Petitioner from Georgetown where she had been residing for the purpose of being hired or employed in said County, the importation was legal & the Petitioner is not entitled to freedom under the act of Virginia of 1792.

 

Refused Ap. 14 1845.

 

3

If the Jury believe from the evidence that Miss Brown was at the time of the removal of the slave & had been for several years previous a Resident & Citizen of the County of Alexa & that she claimed the Petitioner, not by purchase, but through the devise which had been made to her by her Father, the removal from Georgetown or from any other place, into Alexandria County was legal & the Petitioner is not entitled to her freedom on the ground of the said importation.

 

Refused Ap. 12th 1845.

 

4.

If the Jury believe from the Evidence that Miss Brown had a right to emancipate the Petitioner by her will, she is nevertheless not entitled to her freedom under the said will, unless she shows by evidence addresed in the cause, that the Executor mentioned in the said will assented to her freedom.

 

Refused Ap. 14. 1845.

 

If the jury believe from the evidence in this case that Eliz. Brown, residing in 1805 a citizen & resident of Maryland, and there being the owner of the pe plff's mother, removed from the state of Maryland into the County of Alexandria, Dist. of Cola. in the year 1807, or 1808, and continued to reside there from the time of such removal till her death in the year 1825; that in the year 1813, and not before, she imported the plff's mother with the plff herself (then an infant who had been born either in Maryland or in the County of Washington after the said Eliza Brown's said removal) either directly from Maryland or for into the said County of Alexandria, or first from Maryland into the said County of Washington into and from that county, into after a short stay there, into the said county of Alexandria, and there hired them out for two or three years, and afterwards sold them in the said county, where they have remained ever since their said importation, then such importation was illegal, and entitled the plff to freedom. at that under such circumstances, no presumption arises   of the said Eliz. Brown's leaving complied with the requisite prescribed by the provision in the 4th section of the act of the Virginia assembly, passed Dec. 17. 1792, entitled an act

Given. Ap: 14: - nem. con.

 

admitted - for agmnt[?] sake[?].

If the Jury believe from the evidence that Miss Brown & Mrs. Alexander entered into a contract the one to sell & the other to purchase the Petitioner & by such contract Miss Brown intended to invest her sister with the right & interest which she has upheld in the said slave at the time of the contract, then Miss B. had no title to the sd. slave, & had no authority to emancipate her by her will: & it is for the Jury to presume that Miss B sold all her right & interest to the said slave by such agreement, unless the contrary is shown by the Petitioner.

 

qualification to Petitioners instruction

Unless the Miss Brown took the oath required by the 4th sec of the act of 1792

Refused - nem. con Ap. 14 1845

 

If the Jury believe from the evidence in this case that the Plaintiff, with her children Mother, Milly, & other children of said Milly mentioned in the said Will of Elizabeth Brown, were purchased by said F. Alexander from said Eliz: Brown for a limited term of years that is, till they respectively attained the age of 31 years, and with the understanding & condition that they were to be free on their respectively attaining such age: then it was competent for said Eliz: Brown so to dispose of her reversionary interest in said servants as to emancipate them by her last will & Testament upon their respectively attaining such age: and that the said Will of Eliz: Brown did operate as an effectual emancipation of the Plaintiff immediately on the Plaintiff's attaining such age.